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Is Smart Growth Fair Growth:
Do Urban Growth Boundaries Keep Out Racial Minorities?
Introduction
As many American metropolitan areas are continually spreading outward, urban
planners, elected officials, environmentalists, and sociologists are interested in the
effects sprawl is having on our built environment, our natural environment, and
our society. This study poses the question: “Is there a relationship between smart
growth initiatives and racial housing patterns?” More specifically, I focus on the
effect of a widely used smart growth policy—the urban growth boundary
(UGB)—and investigate whether or not the presence of an UGB hinders the entry
of blacks and Hispanics into cities and affects their level of residential segregation
in cities.
An urban growth boundary delineates and separates the area in which
development (e.g., construction of new housing, shopping centers, etc.) is
encouraged or permitted and outside of which development is discouraged or
prohibited. As Pendall et al. (2002: 39) note, however, “little work has examined
the interrelationship of urban containment policies and race and class issues in
metropolitan areas.” This study identifies trends between 1990 and 2000 and
compares places with and without urban growth boundaries.
The focus of this study, the urban growth boundary, is "a line around an
urban area within which development is encouraged—often with density bonuses
or minimum density requirements—to accommodate projected growth over a
specified future time period, typically ten to 20 years" (Nelson 2000: 45). Land
outside the urban growth boundary is restricted to low density uses, such as
agriculture, green space, and/or small amounts of low density housing. The two
purposes of urban growth boundaries are: (1) limiting urban sprawl by promoting
compact and accessible development with efficient public services, and (2)
preserving open space, agricultural, and environmentally sensitive areas.
Contributions of this Study
This study contributes to the understanding of the two-way relationship between
society and land use policies. More specifically, it looks at whether a particular
type of smart growth initiative, the urban growth boundary, influences racial
housing patterns. This inquiry is important because these boundaries are a

relatively new land use technique and are being increasingly employed (Porter
1997). Harden (2006) reports a decline in the black population in two cities with
UGBs (Portland, OR and Seattle, WA), as they are being “priced out” of certain
neighborhoods, though it is not clear whether this is leading to increased or
decreased residential segregation (Harden 2006). As a result, the debate over the
effects of urban growth boundaries on housing costs and, ultimately, on who can
afford to live within the UGBs merits attention from urban planners and urban
sociologists.
Literature Review
Smart Growth and Housing Affordability: Three Perspectives
Smart growth and reduced housing affordability. In the debate over
smart growth’s effect on housing affordability, the most frequently taken position
is that smart growth decreases affordability. The argument is that a smart growth
policy such as the UGB reduces the supply of developable land, and this limiting
of supply causes the price of developable land to increase, which in turn causes
housing costs to rise. Examples of areas where some researchers feel smart
growth has contributed to rising housing costs include Portland, Oregon (Lorentz
and Shaw 2000), Laguna West, California (Gordon and Richardson 1997), San
Francisco, California (Katz and Rosen 1987), and Kentlands, Maryland (Gordon
and Richardson 1997).
Smart growth and increased housing affordability. A second perspective
on the relationship between smart growth and housing affordability is that smart
growth practices can expand the stock of affordable homes. Bullard, Johnson,
and Torres (2003) suggest that infill housing developed in central city
neighborhoods can be affordable. To clarify, infill housing development can be
defined as “new residential development on vacant, abandoned, and underutilized
property within built-up areas of existing communities, where infrastructure is
already in place” (Felt 2007: 2). Bullard, Johnson and Torres argue that such
infill homes can be built economically because the necessary infrastructure (e.g.,
streets, sewer lines, and electric service) are already present. Also, smart growth
utilizes higher residential densities and smaller lot sizes so housing units are
smaller than traditional suburban homes, which might reduce costs. Moreover, to
the extent that smart growth reduces households’ need to use or own automobiles
it reduces transportation costs, and by redirecting some of the savings (less money
spent on gasoline, car payments or insurance) housing costs can be made a more
affordable item in the household budget.
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No relationship between smart growth and housing affordability. The
third position on whether, or how, implementing smart growth principles affects
housing affordability is that it depends on several other situational factors.
Nelson et al. (2002), Downs (2002), Marshall (2000), and Porter (1992) contend
that factors such as demand for housing, location, size, and local economic
conditions affect housing costs so strongly that it is difficult to determine whether
a smart growth policy has a significant effect. In addition, Pendall (1995, 2000)
argues that only certain types of land use regulation influence the cost of housing,
and he finds no relationship specifically between urban growth boundaries and
housing affordability.
Urban Growth Boundaries and Racial Housing Patterns
Studies by Pendall (1995, 2000), Pozdena (2002), Nelson et al. (2004), and
Nelson (2004) examine the relationship between smart growth policies such as
UGBs and racial housing patterns. In theory, the link between UGBs and racial
housing patterns is economic: if UGBs bring about substantially higher housing
costs in a city, then a significant percentage of blacks and Latinos might be
“priced out” of the area because their lower incomes make them less able to
afford housing in cities with UGBs than the more affluent whites. However, in
his study of five forms of growth regulation, Pendall (1995) found that urban
growth boundaries had no effect on racial composition of cities with UGBs.
On the other hand, Pozdena (2002) contends that if the growth restriction
policies implemented in Portland, Oregon (especially a UGB) had been carried
out in the nation's 77 largest metropolitan areas between 1987 and 1997, many
urban families who currently own homes could not have afforded them due to
increased housing prices. Pozdena’s reasoning is that in cities with restrictions on
real estate development, the pressure of population growth on the remaining
developable land causes housing prices to rise substantially, which lowers
homeownership rates among racial minorities. His calculations suggest that
nationally over one million households, including 260,000 minority families,
would be unable to buy a home. Pozdena concludes that, "Restricted growth
policies, therefore, can fairly be dubbed ‘the new segregation’, as they deter
African-Americans and other minorities from the housing market at
disproportionate rates" (Pozdena 2002, p. v).
The price of housing in places with UGBs might affect the number of
racial minority households moving into the area (or how many move away due to
rising housing costs). However, some researchers also examine UGBs and racial
residential segregation (i.e., differences in the groups’ spatial distribution across a
place’s subareas). In theory, the presence of a UGB might contribute to lower
levels of residential segregation since it blocks or limits the development of
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distant suburbs, which in metropolitan areas lacking UGBs have often become
overwhelmingly white communities. In other words, by limiting suburban
sprawl, UGBs could make it more difficult for whites to find spatial areas in
which they can avoid living close to racial minorities, since whites object to
minorities when they are about a third or more of the neighbors (Bobo and
Zubrinsky 1996). Of course, this assumes that fair housing laws are respected or
enforced and also that UGBs do not have the effect of raising housing costs high
enough to permit only a small fraction of the racial minority population to be able
to afford to live in neighborhoods within a city bounded by an UGB.
Nelson et al. (2004) studied change in residential segregation from 1990 to
2000 in 101 metropolitan areas with an urban growth boundary. Segregation
between non-Hispanic whites and African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians was
examined. Other characteristics Nelson et al. (2004) looked at were population
growth, income, crime level, number of manufacturing jobs, and policies
requiring housing for moderate- and low-income households. They found that a
strong containment boundary (i.e., a UGB with severe restrictions on
development outside it) decreases the level of segregation between African
Americans and whites, and has no effect on the segregation of the Hispanics or
Asians.
In a later study, Nelson (2004) linked UGBs with reduced racial
residential segregation. He looked at four metropolitan areas, two that are
bounded by a UGB (Portland, OR and Sacramento, CA) and two that are
unbounded (Charlotte, NC and Bakersfield, CA). For all four metro areas, the
level of black/white segregation declined between 1990 and 2000. However, the
places with UGBs experienced an average reduction of 14.83 percent, while the
places without UGBs experienced an average reduction of only 6.06 percent.
Nelson suggests, therefore, that urban growth boundaries facilitate black/white
desegregation.
Methodology
Sample and Data Sources
The statistical analysis for this study is based on 43 matched pairs of cities – 86
cities, 43 of which have UGBs and 43 of which do not. To obtain the matched
pairs I started with Pendall’s (1995) list of 197 jurisdictions with UGBs as
identified by his 1994 survey. From Pendall’s list, 43 jurisdictions meet the
following criteria for inclusion in the sample: (1) being listed as a city or town by
the Census Bureau in both 1990 and 2000, (2) having a UGB that was established
between 1980 and 1990, (3) having its index of dissimilarity listed on the Lewis
Mumford Center’s segregation index website, and (4) not being located in Oregon
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or Washington (since both states require all urban areas to establish urban growth
boundaries and, as a result, there are no nearby comparable jurisdictions without
UGBs).
Next, a comparable city or town was identified for each of the 43 places
with a UGB. Two factors were initially considered: location and 1990 total
population. Using a United States road atlas (Rand McNally 2004), each city or
town with a UGB was marked with a map flag. Then, for each one, the area was
carefully studied for other places that might serve as the comparable place in my
analysis. To the extent possible, places were identified in the same metropolitan
area, at comparable distance from the metro area’s central city, and with similar
relation to geographic features that are natural (e.g., rivers and lakes) or manmade
(e.g., highways). The 1990 total population size of places was also considered,
and I noted places of similar size as the places with UGBs. The place that met
these location criteria and had the closest population size was selected. These
selected places were then checked for three final criteria: not having a UGB,
being listed by the Census Bureau as a city or town, and having its segregation
index listed on the Lewis Mumford Center’s website. If a selected place did not
meet all three of these criteria, it was replaced with the next best comparable
place in terms of all these criteria. The list of the 43 matched pairs of places
included in this sample is included as an appendix.
Selecting a sample comprised of matched pairs of places that are quite
similar in many respects, but differ with regard to having an UGB, is one way to
reduce (though not completely eliminate) the influence of other causal variables
and highlight impact that urban growth boundaries might have. As noted below,
in the final step of the analysis I also use multiple regression to distinguish the
possible effect of UGBs from that of other variables.
In addition, I purposely selected for comparison two other cities: Portland,
OR (with an UGB) and Atlanta, GA (no UGB). Although these two places
clearly are not “comparable” in way that the other 86 are, many researchers and
observers have contrasted them because Portland has a reputation as a place that
keeps development within a tightly constrained area while, in contrast, Atlanta is
widely known for its extreme degree of suburban sprawl (Cox 1999; Miles, Song
& Frank 2010; Stanford 2003). In this analysis I only use the Portland-Atlanta
contrast heuristically, to suggest what difference an urban growth boundary might
make based on the experience of these two prominent places. The actual
statistical analysis, however, is based only on the other matched pairs of places,
and sometimes the results from the truly comparable places contradict conclusions
that might be drawn from a simple Portland-Atlanta comparison.
The data for this study were obtained from four sources: the U.S. Census
Bureau website (http://www.census.gov), the 1990 Census of Population - Social
and Economic Characteristics (U.S. Census 1993), the Lewis Mumford Center for
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Comparative
Urban
and
Regional
(http://mumford.cas.albany.edu), and Pendall (1995).

Research

website

Dependent Variables
The three racial/ethnic groups studied here are non-Hispanic blacks (“blacks”),
non-Hispanic whites (“whites”), and Hispanics. The three dependent variables
examined in this study are: (1) amount of in-migration to each place between
from 1995-2000 for each of the three racial/ethnic groups; (2) percentage change
in population size between 1990 and 2000 for each of the three racial/ethnic
groups; and (3) change in the level of residential segregation between 1990 and
2000, and the level of residential segregation in 2000, as measured by indices of
dissimilarity between whites and blacks and between whites and Hispanics as
reported on the Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research
(State University of New York at Albany) website. The index of dissimilarity is
the most widely used indicator of a city’s level of segregation. The index ranges
from 0 to 100, and high index values indicate greater residential segregation
between two groups (i.e., each group’s residents are spatially distributed in very
different percentages across a city’s census tracts). The dissimilarity index can
also be interpreted as the percentage of minority residents that would need to
move to a different area in order for every neighborhood to replicate the racial
composition of the city as a whole. Researchers generally regard a score above
60 as a high level of residential segregation, indexes between 30 and 60 are
considered moderate, and dissimilarity indexes below 30 indicate a low level of
residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993).
Independent Variables
A variety of independent variables that may relate to a place’s number of
racial/ethnic minorities and its level of residential segregation are included in the
study. The variables are: (1) whether or not the place has an urban growth
boundary; (2) the 1990 black population and 1990 Hispanic population as a
percentage of the total 1990 population of each place; (3) the number of
households paying 35 percent or more of their income in rent in 2000; (4) the
number of housing units built in the 1990s as a percentage of all 2000 housing
units; and (5) regional dummy variables to capture any geographic differences in
racial housing patterns. These dummy variables are used to code each place’s
region according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s scheme. The reference region is the
Midwest.
In a few cases data on one or more variables was not available. In those
cases, the place with missing data and its matched place was not included in the
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statistical analysis. For that reason, the number of cases listed in Tables 1-5 does
not always equal 43 pairs.
Analysis
I analyze the data in five ways. The first three analyses are designed to discover
whether UGBs have the effect of restraining or reducing the in-movement and/or
population increase of blacks or Hispanics. My first, and most direct, test of this
involves a statistical analysis that compares places with and without UGBs in
terms of how much recent (1995 to 2000) in-migration of blacks, Hispanics, and
whites they have experienced. If UGBs hinder the arrival of racial minorities,
then the average in-flow of whites should exceed that of blacks and Hispanics in
the places with UGBs by significantly more than is the case in the paired places
without UGBs. In this test I use a relative measure of in-migration between 1995
and 2000: number of in-movers of each race as a percentage of each group’s 2000
population size (i.e., percentage of each race’s total population that has recently
moved in). I use a difference of means test to see whether, on average, places
with UGBs have significantly lower levels of black and Hispanic in-migration
than do places without UGBs (and show no difference on white in-movement
level).
My second analysis also tests whether there is a significant difference
between places with and without UGBs in the level of each racial/ethnic group’s
recent in-migration, but in a different way. The number of black, white, and
Hispanic in-movers (arriving between 1995 and 2000) to each place are expressed
as a percentage of each place’s total in-movers. This allows me to see whether or
not, as a percentage of the total stream of in-movers to an area, blacks and
Hispanics form a smaller percentage in places with UGBs than in the matched
places without UGBs (and to see if the same outcome holds for whites).
Since black, white, and Hispanic in-migration to a place is influenced by
the size of its pre-existing same-race population, my third analysis takes this into
account. Each racial/ethnic group’s population change between 1995 and 2000 is
expressed as a percentage of the group’s 1990 population. This population
change reflects both net migration (i.e., difference between in-migration and outmigration) and net natural change (i.e., difference between numbers of births and
deaths). Here the statistical test shows whether, controlling for the places’ initial
size of its black, white, and Hispanic populations, there are significant differences
in the growth of the racial/ethnic groups in the paired cities with and without
UGBs.
The remaining two analyses deal with changes in each place’s 1990 and/or
2000 level of residential racial segregation. First, I use difference of means tests
to determine whether black-white and Hispanic-white residential segregation is
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lower in places with UGBs than in places without them and how level of
segregation changed between 1990 and 2000. Finally, multiple regression is used
to determine if, after controlling for several relevant variables, the presence of an
UGB has an effect on the 2000 level of racial residential segregation in a place.
Limitations and Clarifications
As with all studies, this research has some limitations. The first is that the
meaning and implementation of an “urban growth boundary” is not uniform
throughout the United States, in fact, urban growth boundaries are defined and
administered in a variety of ways in different places. Second, although I tried to
select cities or towns that were quite similar for each pair of places with and
without an UGB, in reality, no two cities or towns are a perfect match. In each
place, there are unique factors that may affect the attraction it holds for different
racial groups and their levels of residential segregation. Third, it is important to
note that places with urban growth boundaries are small or medium size cities and
towns that have relatively low percentages of racial minorities. More specifically,
in 2000, 93 percent of the places with boundaries had black sub-populations of ten
percent or less and 59 percent of these places had Hispanic sub-populations of ten
percent or less. Also, their levels of racial segregation (as measured by the
dissimilarity index) are moderate to low (the same holds for the comparable
places they are paired with in my sample). This means we must be careful about
generalizing the conclusions of this research. My results are most likely to hold
true for places that are similar to those in this sample; I make no claim that if very
large, highly segregated major metropolitan areas (e.g., Chicago, Detroit) adopted
UGBs similar results would be observed. Finally, it is important to keep in mind
that, regarding smart growth policies, this research looks at only the urban growth
boundary. The UGB is just one smart growth technique among an array of
techniques. Some cities and towns that are concerned about sprawl implement
several smart growth measures, which might include an UGB. The additional
effects, if any, of other smart growth practices are not captured by this study. For
discussions of how different smart growth policies affect racial housing patterns
see Pendall et al. (2005) and Nelson et al. (2004).
Results
In-Migration by Blacks and Hispanics
I begin the analyses by showing how patterns in Portland, OR (probably the most
well known place with an UGB) and Atlanta, GA (well known for its sprawl)
compare; then I present the findings from the analysis of my matched sample of
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comparable places with and without UGBs. If a UGB hinders minorities’
movement to a city, we would expect to see lower levels of in-migration by
blacks and/or Hispanics as compared to whites in places with UGBs.
Racial groups’ in-migration in relation to its 2000 size. Comparing
1995-2000 migration to Portland and to Atlanta, recent Hispanic in-movers to
Portland represent 38.0% of the 2000 Hispanic population, while in Atlanta they
represent 53.7%. Recent black in-movers to Portland represent 16.4% of their
2000 population, while black in-movers to Atlanta represent 19.0% of the 2000
black population. For white in-movers, the pattern is similar: in Portland recent
migrants constitute 25.1% of its 2000 white population, while in Atlanta, recent
white in-movers comprise 39.3% of its 2000 white population. Thus, the place
with an UGB (Portland) has relatively less recent in-movement of blacks and
Hispanics than does the place without an UGB (Atlanta), but the same is true for
whites too. Is this true for the other cities and towns in my sample?
Results shown in Table 1 indicate that, in my sample of matched places,
the volume of recent in-migration by blacks is not significantly different in places
with and without UGBs; moreover, the same is true for Hispanic and white inmovement. Thus, the pattern seen in the Portland-Atlanta comparison is not
found in the matched pair sample. For example, in the sample, recent black inmovers constituted, on average, 43.16% of the 2000 black population in places
with UGBs, and 40.05% in places without an UGB (the paired samples t-test
shows this small difference is not statistically significant). For Hispanics and
whites, the differences between places with and without UGBs in terms of mean
levels of recent in-migration are even smaller and also not statistically significant.
This step in the analysis implies that new black and Hispanic residents are being
drawn equally to places with and without urban growth boundaries, so these
boundaries do not appear to be a barrier to their entry.
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Table 1. Difference of Means Tests to Compare Matched Places With and
Without Urban Growth Boundaries: Black, Hispanic, and White
In-Migration (1995-2000) as a Percentage of Each Group’s 2000 Population.

Group & Place
Comparison

# of
Paired
Places

Mean
%
of InMigrants

28

43.16

Std.
Dev.

Diff.
Between
Means

Sign.
Level
(2-tailed
test)

3.11

.308

-.94

.610

-.48

.673

Black In-migrants:
(as % of place’s 2000
total black population)
to places With UGBs

3.34

28

40.05

13.15

to places With UGBs

37

40.79

11.52

to places Without
UGBs

37

41.73

11.36

43

33.34

7.39

to places Without
UGBs
Hispanic In-migrants:
(as % of place’s 2000
total Hispanic
population)

White In-migrants:
(as % of place’s 2000
total white population)
to places With UGBs
to places Without
UGBs

43

33.62

10

8.01

Thus, analysis of these data reveals that boundaries do not reduce the
racial groups’ 1995-2000 in-migration, at least when viewing in-migration as a
percentage of these groups’ population size in 2000. On this measure, I find no
evidence that urban growth boundaries tend to make places less accessible to
blacks or Hispanics.
Racial groups’ in-migration in relation to total in-migration. If UGBs
somehow hinder or discourage racial minorities from moving to or settling in a
city or town, then we would expect to find that racial minorities constitute a
smaller percentage of the total stream of movers into places with UGBs than they
do in places without UGBs. I test this expectation in this step of the analysis. A
comparison of Atlanta and Portland seems to bear it out for blacks but not
Hispanics. In Atlanta, well known for being a very popular destination for black
movers, blacks comprise 41.0% of all people moving there between 1995 and
2000. In contrast, Portland (with an UGB) is not nearly as popular among blacks,
as only 4.1% of all people moving to Portland in those years were black.
However, for Hispanics, there is little difference between Atlanta and Portland.
In Atlanta, 8.5% of all recent in-movers were Hispanic, while 10.0% of Portland’s
in-movers were Hispanic.
Statistical analysis of the matched pairs of places reveals no significant
difference between places with and without UGBs in terms of the percentages of
blacks and Hispanics in the streams of people moving to those places (see Table
2). For places that have UGBs, blacks, Hispanics, and whites, respectively,
constituted, on average: 7.70%, 15.91%, and 71.05% of all recent in-movers; in
places without UGBs the percentages for blacks, Hispanics, and whites are very
similar: 10.24%, 14.05%, and 70.54, respectively. The differences between these
means are not statistically significant at the .05 level.
So, when considering black and Hispanic in-movers in relation to the total
number of in-movers between 1995 and 2000, the data reveal no differences that
might be attributable to the urban growth boundary. Thus, the presence of UGBs
does not appear to reduce the ability of blacks and Hispanics to move into cities
and towns.
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Table 2. Difference of Means Tests to Compare Matched Places With and
Without Urban Growth Boundaries: Black, Hispanic, and White InMigration (1995-2000) as a Percentage of Total In-Migration to Each Place.

Group & Place
Comparison

#
of
Paired
Places

Mean
%
of all InMigrants

Std.
Dev.

Diff,
Between
Means

Sign.
Level
(twotailed test)

Black In-migrants:
(as % of place’s 2000
total in-migration)
to places With UGBs
to places Without
UGBs

28

7.70

12.18

28

10.24

10.24

37

15.91

14.74

-2.53

.180

1.85

.402

.50

.853

Hispanic In-migrants:
(as % of place’s 2000
total in-migration)
to places With UGBs

37

14.05

to places With UGBs

43

71.05

20.28

to places Without
UGBs

43

70.54

20.28

to places Without
UGBs

10.69

White In-migrants:
(as % of place’s 2000
total in-migration)
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Conclusions about in-migration. The presence or absence of an urban
growth boundary does not affect the racial/ethnic makeup of recent in-movers.
This is true whether racial minority in-movers are related to each group’s 2000
size or to the total number of in-movers. Although comparing Portland and
Atlanta may suggest some support for the idea that a place with an UGB will
attract fewer minority movers, statistical analysis of matched places clearly
contradicts it and shows no significant differences in minority movement to
places with and without UGBs. This implies that differences in minority
movement to Atlanta versus Portland are most likely due to factors other than the
presence or absence of an urban growth boundary.
Population Changes of Blacks and Hispanics
Looking at population change offers a broader view of the possible impact of
urban growth boundaries than does in-migration alone. In addition to inmigration, population change captures out-migration, births, and deaths. Again, if
an UGB hinders minorities’ population changes, we would expect to see smaller
black and Hispanic increases in Portland and other places with UGBs than in
Atlanta and other places without UGBs.
Each subpopulation’s change in relation to its 1990 size. Looking at
Atlanta and Portland, we see somewhat similar population changes in the two
cities. Between 1990 and 2000, Atlanta’s black population declined slightly, by
3.4% (mainly due to blacks moving to Atlanta suburbs), and Portland’s increased
slightly, by 4.7%. These two cities experienced more comparable changes in their
Hispanic populations. Atlanta’s Hispanic population increased by 148.8%
between 1990 and 2000, while Portland’s Hispanic population increased by
159.9%.
The analysis of matched pairs yields the finding that UGBs do not impact
minorities’ population changes (see Table 3). Since most places in my sample of
matched pairs had relatively small minority populations in 1990, even small or
moderate population increases produce large percentage changes for the 19902000 decade. For blacks, places with an UGB on average saw an increase of
about 97% in their black population, while places without an UGB experienced a
black population increase of about 111%; however the paired sample difference
of means test shows that this difference between places with and without UGBs is
not statistically significant at the .05 level (p = .470). Similarly for Hispanics,
although places with UGBs, on average, grew by about 10 percentage points less
than places without UGBs (about 125% vs. 136%), the statistical test indicates
that this is not a significant difference (p = .704). Thus, the comparison of the
sample places in matched pairs shows that an UGB does not influence the
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minorities’ population changes, nor does it affect the size of the white population
change.
Table 3. Difference of Means Tests to Compare Matched Places With and
Without Urban Growth Boundaries: Black, Hispanic, and White Percentage
Increase in Population (1990-2000).
#
of
Paired
Places

Mean
Pop.
%
Increase

Std.
Dev.

Diff.
Between
Means

in places With UGBs

43

96.66

123.47

-

in places Without
UGBs

43

110.79

117.51

14.14

43

125.06

177.88

Group & Place
Comparison

Sign.
Level
(twotailed test)

Black Population %
Increase (1990 to 2000)

.470

Hispanic Population %
Increase (1990 to 2000)
in places With UGBs
in places Without
UGBs

43

135.66

151.54

43

19.26

41.06

-10.61

.704

4.76

.399

White Population %
Increase (1990 to 2000)
in places With UGBs
in places Without
UGBs

43

14.50

14

34.86

Level of Racial Residential Segregation
If UGBs affect level of racial residential segregation, we would expect to see
differences between places like Portland, with a UGB, and places like Atlanta,
without a UGB, in their levels of segregation. Comparing the cities of Atlanta
and Portland does reveal a notable difference. Atlanta’s black-white index of
dissimilarity was very high in 1990 (81.3) and remained very high through 2000
(81.6). On the other hand, Portland’s black-white index was considerably lower
in 1990 (63.6) and declined into the moderate range by 2000 (51.8). A
comparison of Hispanic-white changes is also useful. In Atlanta, Hispanic-white
residential segregation was moderate in 1990 (47.9) and it increased (57.8) in
2000. In Portland’s Hispanic-white residential segregation was low in 1990
(22.0) and it also increased (to 29.2) in 2000. Both places experienced an
increase in the residential segregation of their Hispanic populations, a pattern
found in many major U.S. urban areas (Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004).
Nonetheless, for both blacks and Hispanics, residential segregation is lower (in
both 1990 and 2000) in the city with the UGB (Portland) than in the city without
one (Atlanta). We must test to see if this pattern holds up in the matched pairs
sample.
For black-white residential segregation, Figure 1 clearly illustrates the
mean dissimilarity index values for places with and without UGBs. In contrast to
the Portland-Atlanta comparison, in the matched pairs sample, the mean index of
dissimilarity for these places (regardless of whether or not they have an UGB) is
in the low range, but black-white segregation in 1990 was significantly higher in
places with an UGB average (mean dissimilarity index of about 28) than in places
without one (mean dissimilarity index about 21). However, as Figure 1 shows,
by 2000 some convergence occurred in both kinds of places’ mean black-white
dissimilarity indexes. In fact, the 2000 difference in average black-white
segregation between places with and without UGBs (distance on the y-axis) is not
statistically significant (whereas it was in 1990).
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Figure 1. Mean Black-White Index of Dissimilarity for Places With an
Urban Growth Boundary and Places Without an Urban Growth Boundary,
1990 and 2000.
30

Index
28
of
Dissimilarity
26

24

With
UGB

22

Without
UGB

20

1990*

2000**
Year

* 1990 difference is statistically significant
** 2000 difference is not statistically significant

Table 4 shows the matched pairs analysis of the changes in the indexes of
dissimilarity from 1990 to 2000. These results hint at a slight pro-integrative
effect of urban growth boundaries for blacks and whites, but this effect is not
quite large enough to be statistically significant (p = .113). The data in Table 4
suggest that places with UGBs on average had a decline in black-white
dissimilarity index (-1.33), while those without UGBs saw a slight increase
(1.40). This implies that places with UGBs experienced more slight declines or
smaller increases in black-white segregation between 1990 and 2000 than did
places without boundaries, but this difference is too small to be statistically
significant. However, the pattern for Hispanic-white residential segregation is
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different. For places with and without UGBs alike, the mean Hispanic-white
dissimilarity index rose by just over 5 points between 1990 and 2000. Thus there
is no significant difference between how cities with and without UGBs fared in
terms of Hispanic-white residential segregation.
Table 4. Difference of Means Tests to Compare Change in Level of
Residential Segregation in Matched Places With and Without Urban Growth
Boundaries: Black-White and Hispanic-White Indexes of Dissimilarity, 1990
to 2000.

Group & Place
Comparison

#
of
Paired
Places

Mean
Change
in Seg.
Index

Std.
Dev.

Diff.
Between
Means

Sign.
Level
(twotailed test)

Black-White
Dissimilarity Index
Change (1990 to 2000)
in places With UGBs

40

-1.33

9.05

40

1.40

7.08

in places With UGBs

40

5.62

7.64

in places Without
UGBs

40

5.38

7.69

in places Without
UGBs

2.73

.113

0.24

.880

Hispanic-White
Dissimilarity Index
Change (1990 to 2000)

Conclusions about changes in level of racial residential segregation. The
evidence from this step of the analysis provides little or no support for the idea
that urban growth boundaries contribute to lower (or higher) levels of racial
residential segregation. Most places in the sample have low to moderate levels of
residential segregation, and by 2000 differences in black-white and Hispanic-
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white segregation were small enough, between places in the sample with and
without UGBs, to be statistically insignificant.
Multiple Regression Analysis of Urban Growth Boundaries’ Effect on Level
of Racial Residential Segregation
In this last step of the analysis I present two multiple regression analyses, one for
black-white residential segregation and the other for Hispanic-white residential
segregation. The dependent variable is the 2000 black-white and Hispanic-white
indexes of dissimilarity. The independent variables are included based on each
variable’s theoretical relevance to the dependent variable. The independent of
greatest interest is this study is: (a) whether or not the place has an urban growth
boundary. Other independent variables of interest in the multiple regression
models are: (b) percentage of the place’s total population that was black or
Hispanic in 1990 (size of the minority population at the start of the study period);
(c) percentage of households paying 35% or more of their income in rent in 2000
(to address the affordability of rental units, which would be more likely to house
low-income and minority residents than owner-occupied units); (d) number of
housing units built in the 1990s as a percentage of all 2000 housing units (to
address the changes in the local housing market, which affect housing availability
and thus affordability); and (e) regional dummy variables (to capture geographic
differences in residential segregation, but since no matched pairs of places in my
sample are located in the Northeast, the dummy variables are for the South and
West, while the Midwest serves as the regional reference category). Before
presenting the multiple regression findings I provide results based on bivariate
correlations of these variables (see Table 5).
The correlation between having a UGB and the black-white index of
dissimilarity approaches but does not attain statistical significance (r = .181, p =
.096). There is even less evidence of an association between the presence or
absence of an UGB and Hispanic-white residential segregation (r = .069, p =
.529). Thus, simple correlation analysis does not support the idea that having an
urban growth boundary affects a place’s level of residential segregation.
The 2000 black-white dissimilarity index has a positive, but weak,
correlation (r = .345, p = .001) with the percentage of the total population that was
black in 1990. Thus, places with larger black populations in 1990 were more
residentially segregated in 2000 than were places with smaller 1990 black
populations.
Considering Hispanic-white segregation, the percentage of the population
that was Hispanic in 1990 has a positive, moderate correlation (r = .447, p = .000)
with the 2000 Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity. In addition, three more
independent variables have positive, but weak, correlations with the 2000

18

Hispanic-white index. They are: percentage of the total population that was
black in 1990 (r = .219, p = .042), percentage of households that paid 35% or
more of their income for rent in 2000 (r = .341, p = .001), and the place being
located in the West, compared to being located in the Midwest (r = .225, p =
.038). Thus, places with relatively larger black and Hispanic populations in 1990,
places with a larger proportion of residents paying high rents, and places located
in the West generally have higher 2000 Hispanic-white indexes of dissimilarity.
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Table 5. Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Dependent and Independent
Variables used in Multivariate Analysis.
Black/white
dissimilarity
index, 2000

Hispanic/white
dissimilarity
index, 2000

Place
has a
UGB

Percent
black
pop.,
1990

Percent
Hispanic
pop.,
1990

%
paying
>35%
for
rent,
2000

1990s
housing
units
as % of
2000
housing
units

Black/white
dissimilarity
index, 2000

Hispanic/white
dissimilarity
index, 2000

Does place
have UGB?

.485**

.181

.069

.345**

.219*

-.117

Percent
Hispanic
population,
1990

.077

.447**

.104

.119

Percent paying
35% or more
for rent, 2000

.047

.341**

-.088

.151

.462**

Housing units
built in 1990s
as % of 2000
housing units

-.137

-.115

.070

-.146

-.207

-.267*

Place is in
West

-.150

.225*

.023

-.094

.549**

.559**

-.254*

Place is in
South

.198

.011

-.031

.505**

-.141

-.038

.053

Percent black
population,
1990

* p < .05.

** p < .01. (Two-tailed test)
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The correlation matrix also reveals interesting findings about places with
urban growth boundaries. Contrary to the claims of some critics of UGBs, the
presence of these boundaries does not appear to increase the housing affordability
problem. In other words, places with UGBs do not have higher percentages of
households paying more than 35% of their income for rent (r = -.088, p > .05). In
addition, contrary to those who claim that UGBs effectively slow down new
housing construction, the insignificant correlation between UGBs and percentage
of 2000 housing units that were built in the 1990s (r = .070, p > .05) indicates that
places with and without UGBs do not differ in new housing construction. On the
other hand, there is a statistically significant weak negative correlation (r = -.267,
p = .013) between the “new housing” and “high rent” variables. This suggests
that the addition of new housing helps to reduce the cost of rental units.
Factors affecting black-white segregation. Table 6, model 1 presents the
multiple regression results used to identify and evaluate variables related to blackwhite segregation (based on all 86 places in the sample). The adjusted R2
indicates that the independent variables in the model explain 15.2% of the linear
variation in the 2000 black-white index of dissimilarity. Thus a great deal of the
variation in places’ levels of black-white segregation is unexplained by the
variables in this model. Of greater substantive interest, this analysis shows that
the presence of an UGB is a statistically significant predictor of the 2000 blackwhite index of dissimilarity (b = 6.381, Beta = .244, p = .018), controlling for the
other variables in the model. Given the statistically insignificant relationship
between UGBs and 2000 black-white segregation found in the previous steps of
the analysis, this finding is quite interesting. It means that that controlling for
other variables in the model, having an UGB is associated with having higher
2000 black-white dissimilarity index. In other words, when other factors are
equal, places with an urban growth boundary tend to have higher indexes of
dissimilarity (on average by 6.381 points), thus more black-white segregation,
than places that lack an urban growth boundary.
The effects of two other variables are also noteworthy. The strongest
predictor of the 2000 black-white dissimilarity index is percentage black in
places’ 1990 population (b = .578, Beta =.343, p = .005). Again, the effect is
positive, that is, the places with a higher percentage of blacks in 1990 have a
higher segregation. Also, a marginally significant variable, being located in the
West, has a negative effect on the 2000 black-white index (b = -6.518, Beta = .249, p = .078). On average and net of other variables in the model, places in the
West have indexes of dissimilarity that are 6.518 points lower than places in the
Midwest. Both of these results are consistent with previous research on blackwhite residential segregation.
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The multiple regression analysis indicates that urban growth boundaries
have an impact on black-white residential segregation. Specifically, it shows that
a place’s having a UGB is related to a somewhat higher 2000 black-white index
of dissimilarity (i.e., greater segregation) rather than a lower index.
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Table 6. Multiple Regression (OLS) Analysis of Black-White and HispanicWhite Residential Segregation (Index of Dissimilarity), 2000.

Variables

Urban Growth
Boundary
Percent Black in 1990
Percent Hispanic in
1990
Percent paying 35% or
more for rent
in 2000
Housing units built in
1990s as % of 2000
units
Region:
West a
Region:
South a
Constant
Adjusted R2
Number of Cases

Model 1:
Black-White
Segregation, 2000
B
(standard error)
Beta
6.381*
(2.647)
.244
.578**
(.202)
.343
---.31
(.334)
.118
-.12
(.096)
-.132
-6.518†
(3.645)
-.249
-2.06
(4.486)
-.060
16.193†
(9.538)
.152
86

Model 2:
Hispanic-White
Segregation, 2000
B
(standard error)
Beta
1.326
(2.655)
.050
---.495***
(.150)
.404
.580†
(.339)
.218
-.01
(.094)
-.006
-2.86
(3.901)
-.108
1.17
3.919
.034
1.522
(9.623)
.177
86

Notes: † p < .10 *p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
In each cell the top number is the unstandardized regression coefficient, middle
number is the standard error, and bottom number is the standardized
regression coefficient.
a
Midwest is reference category for regions
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Factors affecting Hispanic-white segregation. Table 6, model 2 provides
the multiple regression results for Hispanic-white residential segregation. The
adjusted R2 (17.7%) for the Hispanic-white regression is very close to that of the
black-white regression, indicating that much variation remains after considering
the variables in this model. Upon closer inspection, however, the Hispanic-white
regression results yield one valuable finding that differs from those of the blackwhite regression. Most importantly, the presence of an UGB is not a statistically
significant factor affecting the 2000 Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity. Thus,
there is not a relationship between whether or not a place has an urban growth
boundary and its level of Hispanic-white segregation in 2000.
Only two independent variables are found to be statistically significant in
influencing the 2000 Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity. The first is the
percentage Hispanic in the 1990 population (b = .495, Beta = .404, p = .001).
This is the strongest predictor of 2000 Hispanic-white segregation. The effect is
positive, that is, places with larger Hispanic populations in 1990 had higher
Hispanic-white segregation in 2000. A second marginally significant variable is
the percentage of households paying 35% or more of their income in rent in 2000
(b = .580, Beta =.218, p = .092). This effect also is positive.
Discussion and Conclusion
My findings support the position that urban growth boundaries do not affect either
the racial makeup of cities’ and towns’ in-movers or their population changes.
First, the presence or absence of an urban growth boundary did not affect the
racial/ethnic makeup of the in-movers to the cities and towns in the sample. This
is the case whether the number of black or Hispanic in-movers is analyzed in
relation to each group’s 2000 size or in relation to the total number of in-movers.
Second, the presence or absence of a UGB around each of the places in the
sample did not influence blacks’ or Hispanics’ percentage change in population
between 1990 and 2000. Thus these findings contradict the idea that urban
growth boundaries hinder the in-movement and/or population growth of racial
minorities.
The results of this analysis, however, are more ambiguous regarding the
relationship between UGBs and racial residential segregation. On the one hand,
two findings support Pozdena’s (2002) claim that UGBs increase racial residential
segregation.
First, in 1990 the black-white index of dissimilarity was
significantly higher in places with UGBs than in places without them (see Figure
1). Second, the black-white multiple regression analysis reveals that, with other
variables controlled, having a UGB is associated with a place having a higher
2000 black-white dissimilarity index, on average, by about six points (Table 6
model 1). On the other hand, none of the statistical analyses used here (i.e.,
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difference of means tests, correlations, multiple regression) found any significant
relationship between UGBs and Hispanic-white residential segregation. Also, the
multiple regression model that shows a positive significant UGB “effect” on
black-white residential segregation leaves a lot of unexplained variation, which
implies that it does not tell the “whole story.” Further research would be useful to
discover whether or not UGB’s positive relationship with black-white residential
segregation still holds when other good explanatory variables are added to the
model. Moreover, we should keep in mind that the 2000 black-white dissimilarity
indexes studied here are in the low or moderate range, both for places with and
without UGBs, far below levels found in the larger U.S. cities and metropolitan
areas. Research on blacks’ preferences about desired racial composition of their
neighborhoods indicates that they like residential areas with a substantial black
presence (Charles 2000, 2001; Clayton et al. 2000). Given that most places in my
sample have relatively low percentages of black residents, my regression results
are actually not inconsistent with the claim that places with UGBs are where
black residents are a little closer to achieving their preferred neighborhood racial
composition.
In positioning my research in the ongoing debate about the impact of
urban growth boundaries, I occupy the middle ground. That is, based on the
evidence uncovered here, I do not concur with Pozdena’s (2002) conclusion that
“Portland style” growth containment policies exclude racial/ethnic minorities, nor
do I see UGBs as a strong cause of racial segregation. But, neither do my
findings support Nelson’s (2004) contention that this growth control device
promotes racial integration. My research also shows that conclusions based on
comparisons of Portland and Atlanta often are misleading and should not go
unchallenged.
This study also reveals some interesting insights into factors affecting
black-white versus Hispanic-white segregation. First, it is important to note that
the black-white and Hispanic-white multiple regression analyses share a common
finding, namely that in both cases their respective 1990 group population size is
positively linked to their 2000 index of dissimilarity scores. On further
examination, however, the two multiple regressions reveal that different variables
are associated with the 2000 level of black-white segregation than with the
Hispanic-white segregation. For black-white segregation, the presence of an
UGB has a significant positive correlation with 2000 black-white segregation,
while being located in the West (as opposed to the Midwest) has a significant
negative relationship. For Hispanic-white segregation, the percentage of
households paying 35% or more of their income for rent in 2000 was significantly
correlated with 2000 Hispanic-white segregation level.
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Sociological and Policy Implications
Since this study yields mixed findings about the relationship between urban
growth boundaries and their effects on racial/ethnic minorities, neither a strong
“pro” nor “con” position can be taken regarding UGBs. The preponderance of
evidence suggests that they are not harmful, but sociologists and urban planners
should not be insensitive to or complacent about the possible effects of urban
growth boundaries. Based on this study’s results and the fact that boundaries
have been used widely since only 1980, there is a need for continued interest in
the possible racial impact of boundaries and how UGBs may interact with other
urban or suburban land use, transportation, and development policies (which
might or might not be consistent with smart growth principles). In the future, this
analysis or a similar study should be conducted using 2010 Census data. As
urban growth boundaries remain in force over many decades, their impact on the
U.S.’s ever evolving cities and towns merits continued study.
It is also critical that planners and elected officials remain alert to and
consider the possible effects of their land use decisions on the racial/ethnic
makeup of residents. Just as an environmental impact study is a required part of
many proposals, the possible sociological impacts should also be addressed. As
Bobo suggests, “Always pose an explicit race question” (2000:307).
Gentrification continues to be a concern in relation to smart growth
practices. As mentioned earlier, gentrification by whites and the displacement of
blacks are occurring in both Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, two cities
with urban growth boundaries (Harden 2006). These changes might be due, at
least in part, to the cities’ urban growth boundaries. Since the Pacific Northwest
is the national leader in implementing smart growth measures, it is also at the
forefront of revealing the effects of these techniques. Sociologists and urban
planners should consider the recent dynamics in Portland and Seattle and check
for possible unintended effects of smart growth.
Efforts can be made to ensure that minorities are considered by, and
involved in, smart growth initiatives. Equity planners place a high priority on the
needs of society’s disadvantaged groups and seek to design cities that benefit all
residents. Bobo (2000) suggests the following as measures planners should take
to achieve this goal: incorporating the disadvantaged into the planning process,
considering a proposal’s possible effects on disadvantaged groups, advocating for
low-income housing, and monitoring for possible housing discrimination and
violations of anti-discrimination laws.
Planners can take additional measures to foster stable, racially integrated
neighborhoods. These are suggested by the work of Ellen (2000) who identified
factors that contribute to such neighborhoods. A range of housing options,
including a substantial number of rental units, is correlated with integrated
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neighborhoods. Renting an apartment or house is more affordable than
homeownership, making the area more accessible to minorities. Also, since social
networks are important to maintaining stability, creating venues such as recreation
centers, parks, and meeting facilities is vital. Likewise, ensuring that a
neighborhood has amenities such as stores and services, good schools, and a low
crime rate makes an area desirable to all--whites and minorities, owners and
renters, and current and potential residents.
Conclusion
Is smart growth fair growth? This research, with regard to urban growth
boundaries, shows that the answer is, for the most part, yes. This response is
based on a definition of “fair” as an outcome in which urban growth boundaries
do not hinder the in-movement, population growth, or residential integration of
blacks or Hispanics.
As smart growth practices, and specifically urban growth boundaries, gain
momentum, their possible effect on who lives in areas with boundaries becomes
an increasingly vital concern. Further, as racial and ethnic minorities continue to
make up a greater and greater proportion of U.S. residents, smart growth's impact
on racial housing patterns is an important consideration for land use planners,
sociologists, and society as a whole.
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Appendix: List of pairs of places in sample
State
AZ
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CO
CO
FL
FL
FL
GA
IL
IL
MD
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MO
MO
TX
TX
WI

Place with urban
boundary
Chandler
Mesa
Camarillo
Cathedral City
Dublin
El Cajon
Grand Terrace
Martinez
Milpitas
Oxnard
Pinole
Pleasant Hill
Poway
San Diego
San Rafael
San Ramon
Santa Paula
Thousand Oaks
Golden
Louisville
Clearwater
Pinellas Park
Safety Harbor
Peachtree City
McHenry
W. Chicago
Westminster
Chaska
Eden Prairie
Plymouth
Prior Lake
Ramsey
Stillwater
Woodbury
O’Fallon
St. Peters
Lancaster
McKinney
Franklin

growth
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Place without urban growth
boundary
Peoria
Tempe
Mission Viejo
Banning
Pleasanton
La Mesa
Loma Linda
Pittsburg
Newark
Oceanside
Hercules
Walnut Creek
Santee
Dallas, TX
San Pablo
Danville
Santa Clarita
Simi Valley
Broomfield
Lafayette
Largo
Bradenton
Oldsmar
Newnan
Woodstock
Lockport
Aberdeen
Chanhassen
Minnetonka
Brooklyn Park
Savage
Elk River
White Bear Lake
Oakdale
Bridgeton
St. Charles
Cedar Hill
Allen
Greenfield

State
WI
WI
WI
WI

Place with
boundary
Kenosha
Muskego
New Berlin
West Bend

urban

growth

29

Place without urban growth
boundary
Racine
Glendale
Brookfield
Watertown
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